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The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter due to the Utah Court of Appeals transferring the 
case on its own motion, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Court of Appeals 
had original jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, and Rule 
3(a) and 4(b) Ut. R. App. P. 
-ix-
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OFFICIALS PERFORMING DISCRETIONARY 
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ii. THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED CLEARLY ESTABLISHED 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING 
DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS 
DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Order denying the Plaintiff and Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration and the Order granting the 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss are based upon questions of 
law or mixed questions of law and fact as the Plaintiff 
and Appellant's Amended Complaint was dismissed on a 
U.R.C.P. 12(b) Motion to Dismiss. 
When reviewing a decision of a lower court reviewing 
de novo an order of an administrative agency, the 
Appellate Court acts as if it were reviewing the 
administrative agency decision de novo or directly. 
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6 (Utah 1992). 
Consequently, when reviewing a Motion to Dismiss 
based on a de novo review of an administrative decision 
under Rule 12(b), an Appellate court must accept the 
material factual allegations of the complaint as true, and 
the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 
entitle him to relief. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975, 
-xi l-
979 (1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 
(10th Cir. 1990); Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp, v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); City Arrow Industries, Inc. 
v. Zions First Natfl Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). 
Likewise, this court is obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
appellant, and to indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor, Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 
(Ut.App. 1990), and any questions of mixed fact and law 
which involve primarily a consideration of legal 
principles are reviewed de novo. In Re Ruti-Sweetwater, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). 
-xiii-
Determinative Constitutional, Statutory Provisions 
Regulations 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
rules or regulations whose interpretation is believed to 
be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. Many 
Constitutional provisions, provisions of the Utah Code, 
and Internal regulations of the Defendants are, however 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This is a Section 1983 civil rights action, and an 
action for direct enforcement of specific constitutional 
rights under the United States and Utah Constitutions, on 
behalf of a secondary science teacher to recover his 
teaching certificate, damages and attorneys fees as a 
result of the Defendants1 denial of the Plaintiff's 
clearly established rights to substantive and procedural 
due process. This action involves unique constitutional 
due process issues regarding pre and post suspension 
revocation hearings, substantive due process issues 
relative to revocation hearings, and the role of the 
district court in fashioning remedies. 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This action was filed March 20, 1989. During the 
course of the proceedings, the District Court issued five 
(5) Minute Entry decisions. The Decisions were based 
upon: 
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction: 
Issued April 3, 1989, and April 10, 1989, (District 
Court Index at p. 145, 155-156). 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's damages 
prior to discovery: Issued May 15, 1989, and May 16, 
1989, (Index Ibid, at p. 177, 178). 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: 
Issued November 1, 1989, and November 9, 1989, (Index 
Ibid, at p. 256, 257-259). 
Defendants' Motion for Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint: Issued August 28, 1991, and November 26, 
1991 (Supp. Index Ibid, at p. 474-476, 490-492). 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration: Issued 
December 9, 1991, and March 16, 1992, (Supp. Index 
Ibid, at p. 493, 500-501). 
In summary, the District Court held that the 
Plaintiff had not made a showing of irreparable harm and 
denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Index 
Ibid, at p. 145, 155-156), granted the Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss relative to the Plaintiff's civil rights claims 
prior to discovery as barred by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (Ibid, at p. 177-178), and denied the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning 
the Defendants' use of expunged and sealed records in 
revoking the Plaintiff's certificate to teach (Ibid, at p. 
256, 257-259). During the proceedings below, the 
Plaintiff conducted discovery in the form of 
interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for 
production of documents. (Ibid, at 260-326). 
The Plaintiff then filed a successful interlocutory 
appeal to this court. Ambus v. Utah State Board of 
Education, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990). Following this 
- 2 -
decision, the Plaintiff refiled his Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and the Motion was granted by the trial 
court. As a consequence the Plaintiff's teaching 
certificate was restored, but without other relief, and 
the Plaintiff was given thirty (30) days to file an 
amended complaint to demonstrate what damages, if any, 
were caused by the wrongful revocation of his certificate. 
(Ibid, at p. 356-360). 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed his amended 
complaint. The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
amended complaint, and the Court granted the Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss by Minute Entry, without memorandum 
decision, findings, or any indication of the basis for the 
ruling. (Ibid, at p. 474-476). 
Prior to the Court issuing a final decision, the 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration based upon an 
intervening United States Supreme Court decision , which 
was contrary to the holding of the trial court. The 
Defendants responded in opposition and filed a prepared 
order. (Index Ibid, at p. 493, 500-501). The Court 
denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Hafer v. Melo, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 




This is a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42 
U.S.C., Sections 1983, 1988, and Title 28 U.S.C., Sections 
1331 and 1343, also pursuant to the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, and directly under the due process clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Article I Sec. 
7, 11, of Utah's Constitution for direct enforcement 
thereof, where the Plaintiff originally sought de novo 
judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceedings, 
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. 1953, as amended; 
and also pursuant to Section 78-3-4(5) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, seeking redress for procedural and substantive 
constitutional, and statutory violations. (Addendum A). 
The Plaintiff received his Standard Secondary 
Teaching Certificate with biological and Physical Science 
endorsements (on August 13, 1981) listing with the 
Defendants his permanent address, at 3316 El Serrito Dr., 
SLC, UT 841092 (Index at p. 281). Thereafter the 
Plaintiff commenced teaching in Utah's secondary schools, 
attained tenured status and until the events in this case, 
the Plaintiff's certificate was valid in all respects and 
Except as specifically noted, the following facts are 
undisputed as material factual allegations contained 
within the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Exhibits 
attached thereto. 
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entitled him to teach in any public school in the State of 
Utah or in any other State having reciprocity. 
In August of 1982, the Plaintiff was approved for 
employment with Granite School District, listing the same 
permanent address as with the Defendants USBE in 1981. 
(Index at p. 146-147). 
The Plaintiff's Certificate provided the Plaintiff 
with a protected property and liberty interest. The 
Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff's certificate 
was both suspended and then revoked without notice or 
hearing of any kind. (Index at p. 402-420). 
The Defendants Utah State Board of Education (herein 
"USBE") are charged by the Utah Constitution, Article X 
Sec. 8, and by Utah law, Section 53A-1-401 U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, with the general supervision and control of 
the Utah public school system. As part of the Defendant 
USBE's duties of general supervision and control, it, and 
it alone, has the authority to issue and revoke teaching 
certificates pursuant to Section 53A-6-101 et. seg. U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, see Section 53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953) as 
amended. 
The Defendants Utah Professional Practices Advisory 
Commission (herein "UPPAC"), agents of the Defendant USBE, 
have authority to receive and act upon complaints 
involving immoral or unprofessional conduct, and to make 
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"recommendations" to the Defendant USBE to revoke or 
suspend a state teaching certificate. Section 53A-7-1Q1 
et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
The Plaintiff taught school in Utah until February 
19, 1987, when his employer, Granite School District 
terminated his employment. Through the grievance process, 
the Plaintiff was reinstated. Granite School District 
refused to reinstate him and Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
. . . 3 
Civil No. C88-0059G in December 1987. From September 
1987 through June 1988 the Plaintiff taught school in 
Arizona, and at all times material herein, his permanent 
address was still valid. (Index at p. 146-147). 
On January 27, 1988 the Tribune published a news 
account of Plaintiff's federal lawsuit as a result of 
Granite School District's refusal to reinstate the 
Plaintiff. (Index at p. 275). Based upon these news 
accounts, Defendant Roger Mouritsen, filed a Complaint 
against the Plaintiff before the Defendant UPPAC on March 
18, 1988. The basis of the Defendants' action was the 
Tribune news article which indicated that the Plaintiff 
was allegedly arrested for drug distribution upon the 
This action is pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Oral argument was completed on March 9, 1992 and 
a decision is expected soon. 
- 6 -
allegations of an informer who was an addict and felon• 
(Index at p. 59). 
The alleged events occurred during off-duty hours at 
the Plaintifffs residence. The charges were subsequently 
dismissed and expunged, well over one year prior to the 
Defendants' complaint. The complaint of March 18, 1988 
did not specify if the Plaintiff was charged with 
immorality, unprofessional or incompetent conduct, or with 
evident unfitness for service. 
Under Section 53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
the Defendant USBE through its agent Defendant Roger 
Mouritsen, and Defendant UPPAC were required to provide 
notice of hearing to be sent to the Plaintiff's last known 
address and to the permanent address shown on the records 
of the commission. (Emphasis Added). The Defendant Roger 
C. Mouritsen allegedly mailed a copy of the Complaint to 
the Plaintiff on March 18, 1988 to the address of 831 E. 
Stratford Ave., SLC, UT 84106 and it was allegedly 
4 
returned unclaimed. (Index at p. 59-63) 
On April 11, 1988, the Defendant Roger Mouritsen, 
allegedly mailed a notice of hearing for May 20, 1988 to 
Alleged mail receipts, including the receipt for 
certified mail form, and copy of the envelope proferred by 
the Defendants, do not show an official postmark, postage, 
certified fee, and or date stamped by the U.S. Postal 
Service. (Index at p. 62-63). 
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the Plaintiff at the same address of 831 E. Stratford 
Ave., SLC, UT 84106.5 (Index at p. 64-67) 
Unknown to the Plaintiff, the Defendant UPPAC 
conducted a hearing on May 20, 1988. The UPPAC, without 
inquiring if notice of hearing had been sent to the 
permanent address of the Plaintiff, recommended that the 
Plaintiff's Certificate be suspended until such time as 
the Plaintiff requested a hearing. The UPPAC tendered no 
findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law for this 
action. (Index at p. 68-69). 
Likewise, unknown to the Plaintiff, on July 12, 1988, 
the Defendant UPPAC, and Defendant USBE Certification 
Committee held another hearing attended by Defendants of 
the USBE, M. Richard Maxfield, and Darlene Hutchison. 
Again, no notice of hearing, or even alleged attempt of 
notice was provided to the Plaintiff at his permanent 
address listed with the Defendants. The Defendant 
Certification Committee recommended to the Defendant USBE 
Likewise, the Defendants proferred alleged mail 
receipts, including the receipt for certified mail, and a 
copy of the envelopes, again none of which show an 
official postmark, postage, certified fee, and or date 
stamped by the U.S. Postal Service, which were supposed 
returned unclaimed. 
The Defendants admit that at no time was the complaint 
or notice of hearing sent to the permanent address the 
Plaintiff listed with the Defendants in 1981, as required 
by Section 53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. (Index at 
p. 130, 281). 
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that the Plaintiff's Certificate be revoked rather than 
suspended. The Certification Committee tendered no 
findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law for this 
action. (Index at p. 70). 
On August 24, 1988, Defendant Roger Mouritsen, 
contacted the Plaintiff's employer, Salt Lake City School 
District, who in turn notified the Plaintiff that the 
Defendant USBE had revoked the Plaintiff's Certificate on 
August 19, 1988. (Index at P. 71) At this time, the Salt 
Lake City School District terminated the Plaintiff's 
employment because of the Defendants' allegations that the 
Plaintiff had no valid teaching certificate. There were 
no findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law, and 
this was the first occasion that the Plaintiff learned 
that action had been taken, or was pending, concerning his 
certificate. (Index at p. 71). 
On August 24, 1988, pursuant to Defendant 
Superintendent James Moss' instructions, the Plaintiff 
surrendered his Certificate on August 26, 1988 under 
protest because Defendants' revocation was in violation of 
due process of law. (Index at p. 72). 
On September 26, 1988, the Plaintiff was notified 
that the Defendants had scheduled a hearing "to consider 
reinstatement of your teaching certificate." (Index at p. 
73) . 
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On September 27, 1988, Plaintiff personally and 
through counsel, demanded that Plaintiff's Certificate be 
restored prior to any hearing both by constitutional and 
statutory prescription, that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
due process before his certificate was revoked and not 
after, and that Plaintiff be granted a de novo hearing. 
(Index at p. 76-78). 
On October 13, 1988, Plaintiff's counsel again 
demanded that Plaintiff's Certificate be restored prior to 
a de novo hearing. (Index at p. 80-82) On October 20, 
1988 the Defendants provided an informal hearing to 
"reconsider" whether the Plaintiff's certificate should be 
revoked. The Defendants failed to return the Plaintiff's 
Certificate prior to the hearing. The hearing was 
declared by the hearing officer to be an "informal 
hearing" and was conducted as such under the Defendants' 
Rules for Adjudicative Proceedings. No official record 
was maintained. At the hearing, the Plaintiff provided 
specific written objections which included lack of due 
process. (Index at p. 83-86). Additionally, the 
Plaintiff objected to the hearing unless Plaintiff's 
certificate was restored and was then granted a de novo 
hearing. (Ibid). 
On January 5, 1989, the Defendant UPPAC hearing 
committee Wenzzel, Bosch, Jaussi, and Rasband, through the 
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hearing officer, Defendant Mladejovsky issued its decision 
recommending that the decision of the State Board of 
Education be upheld. No findings of fact, reasons, or 
conclusions of law were provided for this action. (Index 
at p. 88) 
On March 16, 1989, the Plaintiff was informed of the 
decision by transmittal letter from Defendant 
Superintendent Moss. This letter also stated that the 
Defendant USBE also accepted the hearing panel's decision. 
No findings of fact, reasons, or conclusions of law were 
provided for this action. (Index at p. 89). 
On March 20, 1989, Plaintiff requested that the 
Defendants stay its Order revoking Plaintiff's 
certificate. On March 21, 1989 Defendant Moss denied the 
Plaintiff's request for a stay of revocation pending 
judicial review. (Index at p. 90) No findings of fact, 
reasons, or conclusions were stated. Subsequent to the 
filing of the initial complaint on March 20, 1989, the 
course of the proceedings are as previously described. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendants' policy or practice failed to provide 
constitutionally adequate notices of hearing. The 
suspension and revocation of the Plaintiff's certificate 
violated clearly established federal and state 
constitutional and statutory law. The Defendants' 
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unlawful conduct deprived the Plaintiff of his certificate 
to teach and damaged the liberty and privacy interests of 
the Plaintiff's good name, reputation and professional 
image sufficiently to impose a stigma and disability 
depriving him of employment opportunities in this and 
every state in the United States. Once constitutional 
violations are properly alleged and established, this 
court is required and empowered to design legal and 
equitable remedies effective to cure the constitutional 
violations. 
The Plaintiff through counsel petitioned the court 
for judicial review asserting four causes of action in his 
Amended Complaint. The First Cause of Action restated the 
original Complaint's prayer for declaratory and injunctive 
relief restoring the Plaintiff's Certificate, and for 
prospective ancillary relief of attorney's fees incurred, 
court costs, costs of appeal and other ancillary relief 
deemed proper by the court. The Defendant USBE and its 
members were properly sued in their entity and official 
capacity for prospective injunctive relief and attorneys 
fees. 
In respect to the Second through Fourth Causes of 
Action, Plaintiff alleged general, special, compensatory 
and punitive damages against the Defendants in their 
individual capacities. The individual Defendants were 
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properly sued in their individual capacities for acts 
taken in their official capacities. 
The Plaintiff maintains the applicable statute of 
limitations does not apply in this action due to relation 
back to the original complaint where the original 
defendants are sued in a different capacity to properly 
satisfy the existing judgment. 
The Plaintiff also maintains that he has suffered a 
distinct and palpable injury creating a personal stake in 
the outcome of this dispute, and has viable claims for 
damages and attorneys fees already incurred. 
The Plaintiff maintains that the defense of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act is inapplicable to claims of 
violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
Neither the Utah Governmental Immunity Act nor qualified 
immunity apply here as the deprivations caused by the 
Defendants occurred while acting in their ministerial 
capacities and while performing ministerial duties which 
were constitutionally owed to the Plaintiff. Even so, the 
Defendants have violated clearly established legal rights 
of the Plaintiff which disallows a qualified immunity 
defense. 
Defendants have not cited authority or facts on which 
this court can condone or countenance their constitutional 
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violations and unlawful conduct in breaching constitutional 
duties owed to the Plaintiff• 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1 MOTION 




In Ambus v. State Board of Education, supra, this 
Court reversed the District Court and granted the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff's 
Third Cause of Action in his original complaint which 
complained about the Defendant's use of sealed and 
expunged records in the post-revocation hearing. The 
Court remanded to permit the Defendants the opportunity of 
introducing any other evidence it had on the alleged 
misconduct of the Plaintiff if any existed. 
On remand following the decision in Ambus, supra, the 
District Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action when the 
Defendants offered no further evidence of alleged 
misconduct by the Plaintiff. The District Court ordered 
the restoration of the Plaintiff'F certificate, ordered 
the Defendants to notify each school district that the 
certificate had been restored, ordered that the Defendants 
provide satisfactory proof of compliance, and permitted 
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the Plaintiff to amend his complaint to more particularly 
set forth his elements of damages which occurred as a 
result of the wrongful revocation of the Plaintiff's 
Certificate to teach. 
The Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on December 
26, 1990. The Amended Complaint restated the causes of 
action alleged in his original Complaint; however it set 
forth the parties, the capacity of the parties being sued, 
and the damages with greater particularity. The District 
Court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
denied him any relief in the form of damages, attorneys 
fees, or court costs and forms the basis of this appeal. 
The Amended Complaint describes the parties to the 
suit and the capacities in which they are sued. Paragraph 
3 alleges that the Utah State Board of Education is sued 
as a "state entity" for prospective injunctive relief, 
attorneys fees, and court costs. Paragraphs 4 through 7 
alleges that the individual members of the Defendant USBE 
and others, are sued in their official capacities as well 
as their individual capacities. No damages are sought 
against the individual defendants in their official 
capacities. 
The Amended Complaint, like the original complaint, 
seeks prospective injunctive relief restoring Plaintiff's 
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certificate plus ancillary attorneys fees and costs 
against the Utah State Board of Education as a state 
entity and the individual members in their official 
capacities. The Amended Complaint, like the original 
complaint, seeks general, special, and punitive damages 
against the individual defendants in their individual 
capacities for the Plaintiff's loss of employment, medical 
expenses, mental and emotional distress, and related 
damages. 
The graveman of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is 
the wrongful revocation of his certificate to teach 
resulting in the damages alleged- The Amended Complaint 
asserts four causes of action. The first cause of action 
requests judicial revi ^w and injunctive relief, attorneys 
fees, and costs restoring the Plaintiff's certificate to 
teach. The second cause of action alleges that the 
Defendants failed to provide appropriate due process by 
failing to provide any pre-deprivation hearing prior to 
the revocation of the Plaintiff's certificate, by failing 
to restore the Plaintiff's certificate before the 
Defendant conducted their "reconsideration hearing", and 
by failing to provide any findings or conclusions, all of 
which resulted in the loss of Plaintiff's employment, 
corresponding special and general damages, along with 
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attorneys fees and costs. The third cause of action 
alleges that the use of sealed and expunged records during 
the post-deprivation hearing violated the Plaintiff's 
constitutional and statutory rights, which was determined 
by this Court in Ambus, supra, and sought corresponding 
attorneys fees and costs. The fourth cause of action 
seeking damages alleges that the post-deprivation hearing 
violated no due process by the use of the sealed and expunged 
records, by failing to restore the Plaintiff's Certificate 
before the "reconsideration hearing", and by failing to 
have any findings of fact or conclusions of law resulting 
in a deprivation of the Plaintiff's liberty and property 
rights. 
B. 
THE DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ARE 
PERSONS UNDER TITLE 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 AND MAY BE SUED 
IN STATE COURT FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, 
ANCILLARY ATTORNEYS FEES, AND COURT COSTS. 
The District Court restored the Plaintiff's 
Certificate to teach. As such, the Plaintiff was a 
successful party under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 for 
purposes of attorneys fees and court costs. Nevertheless, 
the District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint without even considering them. 
Clearly, the District Court erred. While state 
agencies and officers in the official capacities are not 
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"persons" for purposes of assessing damages against them, 
Will v, Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 
S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), they certainly are for 
purposes of prospective injunctive relief and 
corresponding attorneys fees. As Will explained, 105 
L.Ed.2d at 58, n. 10: 
"Of course a state official in his or her 
official capacity, when sued for injunctive 
relief, would be a person under Section 1983 
because 'official-capacity1 actions for 
prospective relief are not treated as actions 
against the State." 
The Will Court cited Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 
L.Ed.2d 114, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985) for this proposition. 
Attorneys fees and court costs are proper awards 
under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 as ancillary to the 
relief of prospective injunctive relief. Hutto v. Finney, 
437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in not 
considering the Plaintiff's request for attorneys fees and 
costs by dismissing his Amended Complaint. 
C. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR INJUNCTIVE AND 
DECLARATORY RELIEF BECAUSE A CASE OR CONTROVERSY STILL 
EXISTS. 
The Defendants asserted at the trial court level that 
no case or controversy existed after ":he Plaintiff's 
teaching certificate had been restored to him. 
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Accordingly, they argued that the Plaintiff's complaint 
had to be dismissed. 
In response, the Plaintiff asserted that a case and 
controversy existed under the Plaintiff's claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief because no attorneys 
fees or court costs had been awarded which were ancillary 
to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and 
because the Defendants offered no proof of compliance with 
the Court's Order that each state, which was notified of 
the Plaintiff's revocation to teach, was subsequently 
7 
notified of the reinstatement. 
No question exists that attorneys fees and court 
costs are core elements in civil rights cases seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief. Hutto v. Finney, 
supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); and 
Missouri v. Jenkins by Ageyi, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989). 
Indeed, Congress enacted Section 1988 of the Civil Rights 
Act to insure that successful litigants receive a 
reasonable attorneys fee because they fulfill a role of 
private attorney generals. 
The Plaintiff restated his cause of action for 
As of this date, the Plaintiff remains unsuccessful in 
finding a school district in Utah or elsewhere which will 
hire him. He has been effectively "black-balled". 
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injunctive relief in his Amended Complaint because he had 
not been awarded his attorneys fees and court costs and 
because no satisfactory proof of compliance with the 
Courtfs Order had been provided. Likewise, the Plaintiff 
has suffered a "distinct and palpable injury" and the 
Plaintiff's viable claims for damages has created a 
personal stake in the outcome of this dispute, 
accordingly, a case and controversy still exists. Provo 
City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456-457 (Utah 1989). 
D. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
i. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS 
TIMELY FILED. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff learned of the 
suspension and revocation of his certificate on August 24, 
1988. However, he was required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies which consisted of the 
"reconsideration hearings" which ended on March 21, 1989 
when the Defendant Moss denied a stay. The Plaintiff 
filed this action on March 20, 1989. Therefore, the 
federal claims in the instant action were more than timely 
filed initially. 
The Plaintiff!s Amended Complaint was also timely 
filed. As stated above, he was required to exhaust his 
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administrative remedies. The Plaintiff learned of the 
decision denying reconsideration on March 16, 1989. 
Consequently, the statute of limitations period never 
commenced until the completion of the "reconsideration" 
decisions were completed and the Plaintiff was notifed of 
the decision, or March 16, 1989. The amended complaint 
was filed well within the statute's period which the 
Defendants claim as their defense. It was filed on 
December 26, 1990. 
ii. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS RELATION BACK IS PROPER AS 
TO THE ORIGINAL DEFENDANTS. 
After the successful interlocutory appeal to this 
court in Ambus, supra, the trial court allowed the 
Plaintiff thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint. 
(Index at p. 356-359). The Plaintiff filed his amended 
complaint December 26, 1990. (Index at p. 370-401). The 
complaint names the Utah State Board of Education and all 
of the the original Defendants in their official and 
individual capacities who were involved in violating the 
constitutional and statutory rights of the Plaintiff. 
(Index at p. 370-373). 
The Defendants claim that the applicable statute of 
limitations is Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended (1987). The Defendants claim that the Plaintiff's 
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Certificate was revoked on August 24, 1988, and because 
the Amended Complaint was filed on December 26, 1990, it 
is barred by Section 78-12-28(3). 
As previously mentioned the Plaintiff initiated this 
action March 20, 1989, for violations of his 
constitutional and statutory rights without notice, 
hearing, findings or due process of law and requested 
damages and attorneys fees, well within the limitations 
period the Defendants' claim as a defense. 
Even assuming the Defendants' argument that this 
limitations period applies, under both U.R.C.P. 15(a-c) 
and its federal counterpart F.R.C.P. 15(a-c), relation 
back to the original pleading is allowed here because (1) 
Defendant Superintendent Moss was served with the original 
complaint within the limitations period putting all of the 
Defendants on notice in their official capacities; (2) the 
State Attorney General's Office has represented all of the 
Defendants from the outset; (3) there is no change in the 
parties before the court, all parties have been on notice 
of the facts out of which the claims arose; (4) relation 
back is allowed as the Plaintiff only seeks to change the 
capacity in which the Defendants are sued to properly 
satisfy the judgment, (5) the Defendants have claimed no 
cognizable prejudice in their motion to dismiss, and, 
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indeed, cannot since the Defendants had notice that the 
Plaintiff was attempting to assert claims against them, 
(6) no prejudice exists in fact because a change in the 
Defendants capacities only means that the parties 
themselves have been identified correctly and have 
received notice; (7) the delay in amending the complaint 
was caused by the Plaintiff's interlocutory appeal in 
Ambus, supra; (8) an amendment is proper even if a statute 
of limitations has run during the intervening time. 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 768 P.2d 1350 
(Ut.App. 1990); Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 
(Utah 1981); Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 
(Utah 1976). 
The rule in the State of Utah, under U.R.C.P. 15(a), 
and its federal counterpart, provides liberally for 
amendment of pleadings. Especially before trial, leave to 
amend "shall be freely given when justice so reguires", 
and the adverse party is given a fair opportunity to meet 
it. Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971); Foman 
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). U.R.C.P. 15(c) states: 
"[W]henever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence, set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading." Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., supra, at 1359. 
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These rules were adopted to pursue the broad policy which 
favors resolution of disputes on the merits rather than 
legal technicalities, and relation back is allowed under 
the rules even if a statute of limitations has run during 
the intervening time. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., supra at 
882. 
In the instant case, this is particularly valid 
where, the real parties have an identity of interest, were 
alerted to the proceedings from their inception, and the 
Defendants have exploited the running of the statute of 
limitations, and now raise the defense in a motion to 
dismiss, because they know that they are the proper 
parties. Courts have even allowed Plaintiffs to claim an 
estoppel where an initial pleading error has been 
exploited until the running of the statute of limitations. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, supra, at 906. 
Amending the Plaintiff's complaint to include the 
Defendants in their individual capacities is proper as the 
constitutional deprivation caused by the Defendants are 
the same unconstitutional acts set forth in the original 
complaint. The Plaintiff's amended complaint makes no 
change in the parties before the court. 
Consequently, the identity of interest and 
constructive notice have been satisfied through the 
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Defendants and their agents, and through its attorneys, 
who have had actual knowledge from the inception of this 
action within the limitations period, and relation back is 
proper, as no new conduct, transaction, or occurrence is 
alleged. Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, supra at 906; Kirk v. 
Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407-408 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International U. of OP. Eng., 
439 F.2d 300, 306 (10th Cir. 1971); Morrison v. Lefevre, 
592 F.Supp. 1052, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Florence v. 
Krasucki, 533 F.Supp. 1047, 1054 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Seber v. 
Daniels Transfer Co., 619 F.Supp. 1311, 1314 (W.D.Pa. 
1985); Taliferro v. Costello, 467 F.Supp. 33, 35-36 
(Ed.Pa. 1979). 
Likewise, the instant Defendants have been on notice 
of the facts out of which the claims arose. The 
Plaintiff's amendment to include damages does not import 
any new or different causes of action, or a change in the 
legal theory of the case under the instant facts, and 
results in no prejudice to the Defendants. Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983); 
Roper v. Spring Lake Development Co., 789 P.2d 483 485 
(Colo.App. 1990). 
The Plaintiff's amended complaint has done no more 
than change the manner in which to properly satisfy the 
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judgment against the Defendants. This has been held 
proper in the case of change in capacity of both 
Defendants' and Plaintiff's, and upholds the philosophy 
underlying the purpose of both U.R.C.P. 15(a-c) and 
F.R.C.P. 15(a-c), rejecting the approach that pleading is 
a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be 
decisive to the outcome and upholds the principle that 
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits; 
and relation back is proper when only a change in the 
capacity of the instant Defendants is sought. Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); Myers v. Interwest 
Corp. supra, at 882; 3 Moore's Federal Practice Section 
15.15[4.-1] at 15-157: "Where plaintiff sought to change 
the capacity in which the action is brought, or in which 
defendant is sued, there is no change in the parties 
before the court, all parties are on notice of the facts 
out of which the claim arose and relation back was allowed 
in both the case of the plaintiff and the defendant."; 
Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International U. of Op. Eng., 
supra, at 306; Kirk v. Cronvich, supra; Qppenheimer Mendez 
v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975); Cook v. 
Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 477 (K.Y.App. 1978); Longbottom 
v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968). 
In the interest of justice and in accord with the 
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interlocutory appeal in Ambus, supra, it was an abuse of 
the trial court's discretion to reject the amended 
complaint, as it has prejudiced the Plaintiff's remedy at 
law. Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor State Sovereign 
immunity can bar suits for money damages brought against 
State officials in their individual capacities when they 
are alleged to have violated federal law. Hafer v. Melo, 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283, 100 S.Ct. 553, 
558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 488 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 115 (1985); Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) 
iii. 
THE CURRENT APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS BEEN 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY RESTRICTED. 
The well plead facts of the Plaintiff's amended 
complaint shows he timely filed his federal claims. Yet 
the Defendants claim the Plaintiff's federal claims are 
barred by the two year Statute of Limitations found in 
Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953), as amended (1987). 
This court has already guestioned the validity of the 
shortend limitations period contained in the statute. 
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337, 1339 
n. 1 (Utah 1987). 
The Plaintiff submits that the Utah legislature's 
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restriction of Section 78-12-28(3), and attempt to replace 
Section 78-12-25(2), now codified as 78-12-25(3) U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, (1987), has unconstitutionally 
restricted his civil rights claim, and discriminates 
against federal civil rights remedies. A proper 
limitations period is four years, the limitations period 
for personal injury actions. 
Utah's statute ignores the admonitions of the United 
States Supreme Court, and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which hold that because 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims are 
best characterized as personal injury actions, i.e., 
injury to the rights of another, that a State's personal 
injury statute of limitations should be applied to all 
Section 1983 claims. Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct 573, 577 
(1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 
1938, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d (1985); Mismash v. Murray City, 730 
F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (in banc). 
In Wilson v. Garcia, supra at 265, 105 S.Ct. at 1941, 
the United States Supreme Court approved and upheld the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals characterization of Section 
1983 claims as remedies for personal injury actions. In 
Wilson supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1947, the court determined 
that, in considering whether all Section 1983 claims 
should be characterized in the same way for limitations 
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purposes, it was necessary to look to the remedy which 
Section 1983 provides. The court characterized the rights 
enforceable under Section 1983 in the following manner: 
"Finally we are satisfied that Congress would 
not have characterized Section 1983 as 
providing a cause of action analagous to state 
remedies for wrongs committed by public 
officials. It was the very ineffectiveness of 
state remedies that led Congress to enact the 
Civil Rights Acts in the first place. 
Congress therefore intended that the remedy 
provided in Section 1983 be independently 
enforceable whether or not it duplicates a 
parallel state remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 173, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476 (1961) In 
veiw of our holding that Section 1983 claims 
are best characterized as personal injury 
actions, (emphasis supplied) the Court of 
appeals correctly applies the 3-year [personal 
injury statute] statute of limitations. 
The court thus decided that one "simple broad 
characterization" of all Section 1983 actions was 
appropriate under Section 1988, as it best fit the 
statute's remedial purpose. Id. at 272, 105 S.Ct. 1945. 
In Owens v. Okure, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 582, and 582 
n. 12, the United States Supreme Court again upheld the 
principles enunciated in Wilson v. Garcia, supra, and held 
that courts considering Section 1983 claims should borrow 
the general or residual statute for personal injury 
actions. The court recognized that Wilson had rejected 
recourse to other claimed limitations provisions in the 
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first instance, and held that: 
"Courts should resort to residual statutes of 
limitation only where state law provides 
multiple statutes of limitations for personal 
injury actions and the residual one embraces, 
either explictly or by judicial construction, 
unspecified personal injury action." 
Such was the case in Utah when Mismash v. Murray 
City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (in banc) was 
decided. At that time, Utah had a general personal injury 
"residual provision" which applied to all actions for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law. Id., at 1367. 
After Mishmash, the Utah legislature amended Section 
78-12-28(3). In doing so, the Utah legislature ignored 
the federal court decisions concerning the use of the 
proper statutes of limitations for personal injury 
actions. The Utah legislature also ignored the United 
States Supreme Court admonition to apply the residual 
statute. 
The Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the proper 
characterization of a Section 1983 civil rights claim as a 
matter of federal law. The federal values at issue in 
selecting a limitations period for Section 1983 claims in 
Utah's state courts require this court to follow the 
federal remedial nature of compensation and deterrence 
under Section 1983, and adopt a state rule which follows 
this courts judicial construction of personal injury 
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actions. This court's rule for the State of Utah will 
allow the Utah courts to follow the admonition of the 
United States Supreme Court in Wilson, and Owens supra: 
"[t]hat the borrowed period of limitations not 
discriminate against the federal civil rights 
remedy"); Wilson supra at 471 U.S. 276, 105 
S.Ct. 1947; "([F]ederal interests in 
uniformity, certainty, and the conclusion that 
Congress favored this simple approach; see 
also Id., at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1945 "[A] 
simple, broad characterization of all Section 
1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial 
purpose"). Owens v. Okure, supra, 109 S.Ct. 
at 576; ([t]he state rule is adopted as "a 
federal rule responsive to the need whenever a 
federal right is impaired.") ([C]ongress 
surely did not intend to assign to state 
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in 
the formative function of defining and 
characterizing the essential elements of a 
federal cause of action.") Wilson, supra at 
270, 1943. 
The Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the Wilson 
standard of a "broad characterization" of Section 1983 
actions in Utah's state courts and to take into account 
practicalities that are involved in litigating federal 
civil rights claims, and to follow this court's own 
decisions concerning personal injury actions, and to adopt 
the four (4) year statute of limitations found in Section 
78-12-25(3) (1953), as amended, as applicable in Section 
1983 actions. Owens v. Okure, supra at 578 citing Felder 
v. Casey, 487 U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 
(1988); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm., 17 P.2d 239, 
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240 (Utah 1932). 
E. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983, 1988 ARE BARRED BY 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE LAW OF THE 
CASE. 
The Plaintiff submits that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, cannot control the Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 claims. The "Act" may not provide immunity 
for ministerial violations of constitutional rights. As 
the United States Supreme Court held that: 
"Conduct by persons acting under color of 
state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 or Section 1985(3) cannot be 
immunized by state law. A construction of the 
federal statute which permitted a state 
immunity defense to have controlling effect 
would transmute a basic guarantee into an 
illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of 
the Constitution insured that the proper 
construction may be enforced...The immunity 
claim raises a question of federal law." 
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-284 
n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 553, 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 
488 n. 8, (1980) citing Hampton v. Chicago, 
484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert 
denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 
L.Ed.2d 471. 
This court has recognized that Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act may not bar a valid Section 1983 claim. 
Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra. 
Likewise, the Plaintiff's federal claims may not be 
barred by failure to meet notice of claim requirements. 
The notice of claim statutes are pre-empted by federal 
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law. Felder v. Casey supra; Edwards v. Hare, 682 F.Supp. 
1528, 1535 (D.Utah 1988). 
The Plaintiff re-emphasizes that the Defendants in 
their individual official capacities are "persons" 
reachable under Section 1983 when sued for prospective, 
injunctive, equitable relief for conduct violative of 
federal law. As the United States Supreme Court explained 
in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71 
n. 10 109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10, 
105 L.Ed.2d at 58 n. 10: 
"Of course a state official in his or her 
official capacity, when sued for injunctive 
relief, would be a person under Section 1983 
because "official-capacity actions for 
prospective relief are not treated as actions 
against the State." citing Kentucky v. 
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 
3099, 3106 n. 14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 454 (1908) 
see Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 
S.E. 2d 276, 284 (N.C. 1992); Gray v. 
University of Kansas Medical Center, 715 
F.Supp. 1041, 1043 (D.Kansas 1989). 
The individual Defendants sued in their official 
capacities are likewise reachable for the ancillary relief 
of attorneys fees incurred to the prospective equitable 
relief of the return of the Plaintiff's Certificate 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. 1651 (1990); Missouri v. 
Jenkins By Agyei, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989); Hutto v. Finney, 
437 U.S. 678, 690 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2573, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 
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(1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 
2222, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); 
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Ut. App. 1990). 
The damages for the Plaintiff's properly alleged 
constitutional violations by the Defendants in their 
individual personal capacities for these acts, likewise, 
may not be immunized by state law. Hafer v. Melo, 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 
L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 
S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The trial courts 
holding that the Plaintiff's federal claims are barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was clear error. 
The trial court also adopted the Defendants' 
contention that the Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 
law-of-the-case doctrine. The Defendants argued before 
the trial court that the court should not reverse itself 
on this issue even though the trial court's initial 
decision was wrong. The Plaintiff alleged that the 
doctrine of the law of the case did not prevent a judge 
from reconsidering his previous nonfinal orders. The 
Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants' violation of 
clearly established constitutional and statutory law, and 
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this court's decision in Ambus v. Utah State Board of 
Education, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990), constituted grounds 
for the court to reconsider its previous erroneous 
applications of the law. Plumb v. State of Utah, 809 P.2d 
734 (Utah 1990). The trial court's failure to reconsider 
its previous erroneous applications of the law was clear 
error. 
F. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS, SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES UNDER 42 
U.S.C. SECTION 1983, ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY. 
i. 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY APPLIES ONLY TO OFFICIALS PERFORMING 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS. 
The well plead facts of the Plaintiff's amended 
complaint alleges ministerial violations of the 
Plaintiff's civil rights under Section 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983, 1988, as well as under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions for direct enforcement thereof, by State 
officials in their personal capacities, acting under color 
of law. Damages are sought from the individuals in their 
personal capacities. 
The trial court adopted the Defendants' contention 
that the "individual" defendants, inasmuch as they are 
sued in their personal capacities under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983, are entitled to "qualified immunity." (Index at p. 
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490-492). The court's decision did not identify the law 
upon which it relied nor did it state the basis for its 
conclusion (Ibid.) 
It is well established that the instant Defendants 
are state governmental officials who may be sued in their 
individual capacities for damages for violations of 
federal law under Section 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 52 L.Ed. 714 
(1908). These holdings were recently affirmed and applied 
in Hafer v. Melo, U.S., 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 
301 (1991). 
Admittedly, the instant Defendants may raise a 
defense of qualified immunity for discretionary acts. If 
an assertion of qualified immunity is raised, it is 
evaluated under the standard enunciated by in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 
(1982). Normally, qualified immunity is a defense which 
must be pleaded in an answer to a complaint, Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 636, 100 S.Ct. 1920 64 L.Ed.2d (1980); 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 815, 102 S.Ct. at 2736. 
In the instant case the Defendants have not plead the 
defense in an answer, but have raised the defense as a 
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motion to dismiss. 
Under these circumstances the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has identified the appellate standards for 
reviewing qualified immunity upon a motion to dismiss. 
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 
642 (10th Cir. 1988); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 
930, 932-934 (10th Cir. 1987). Under a Motion to Dismiss 
the Defendants must be deemed challenging the sufficiency 
of the complaint on its face, i.e., the Plaintiff's 
pleaded facts fail to show that the Defendants conduct was 
ministerial or violated clearly established constitutional 
or statutory law of which a reasonable person would have 
known. 
At the trial court, the Plaintiff responded by 
identifying the Defendants1 acts which violated the law by 
failing to provide notice, hearings, findings, and 
violation of the expungement code, as ministerial 
operational acts that were constitutionally, statutorily 
and administratively regulated duties owed to the 
Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff likewise identified constitutional and 
statutory law that Defendants violated which was clearly 
established when the alleged violations occurred. 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
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542 (1985); Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1980); 
State v, Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (1978); (Index at p. 
452-463). While the Plaintiff agrees that the principles 
enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald supra, controls these 
issues, it does not reguire entry of judgment in favor of 
the Defendants in the inscant case. 
An evaluation of gualified immunity under Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald supra, at 817-818, 102 S.Ct. 2737-2738, sets 
forth a presumptive knowledge of and respect for basic 
clearly established constitutional rights, and sets forth 
an objective standard for determining whether gualified 
immunity will act as a bar to further litigation in a suit 
by providing that: 
"government officials performing discretionary 
functions generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known." 
On the other hand, a Defendant official may be held 
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official 
action if he was performing ministerial functions, or if 
his discretionary conduct was violative of what has been 
come to be known as the Harlow "objective legal 
reasonableness test." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 107 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d (1987). 
In Anderson supra, at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, the 
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Supreme Court attempted to explain what the court meant by 
"clearly established" as used in Harlow supra. In order 
to make "clearly established law" meaningful with regard 
to the "objective legal reasonableness test", the court 
set forth the more particularized inguiry: 
"The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing 
violated that right. That is not to say that 
an official action is protected by gualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful, but it is 
to say that in light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent." 
This approach has been recongized by the Tenth Circuit, 
in Garcia By Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 
1987); and Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 
1991). This approach does not expect officials to 
anticipate the evolution of law, but does not give the 
officials "liability-free violations of constitutional or 
statutory requirements." Insisting on a precise factual 
correspondence between the conduct at issue and reported 
case law is tantamount to such a license. People of Three 
Mile Island v. Nuclear Reg. Com'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 145 (3rd 
Cir. 1984). 
Courts interpreting Harlow supra, have determined 
that Harlow, has created a two-part analysis to determine 
if qualified immunity should apply to defendants in any 
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given case. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 
(11th Cir. 1991). The Defendant public official must 
first factually prove that he was acting within the scope 
of his "discretionary authority" when the alleged wrongful 
acts occurred, and if so proven, the Plaintiff must come 
forward with the burden of proof demonstrating that the 
Defendant public officials1 actions violated clearly 
established statutory or constitutional or law. 
This court need not decide the clearly established" 
issue in this case because qualified immunity is 
recognized only as a threshold matter under Harlow supra, 
where the defendant officials are performing 
"discretionary functions." Harlow supra, 457 U.S. 818, 
102 S.Ct. at 2738; Wolfenbarger v. Williams, supra at 932; 
Utah State Univ., Etc. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1982); Dobos v. Driscoll, 537 NE.2d 558 (Mass. 1989); 
Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 513 N.E.2d 
1277 (Mass. 1987) (where acts are ministerial, no valid 
claim of qualified immunity can be raised). 
Courts are familiar with the discretionary-
ministerial distinction. Discretionary decisions occur on 
a broad, policy-making level and ministerial decisions 
take place at the implementing, ministerial, or 
operational level. Little v. Utah Div. of Family 
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Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State of 
Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
In the instant case, assuming that the decision of 
the Defendants to bring charges against the Plaintiff to 
suspend or revoke his certificate were "discretionary", 
once that decision was made, the ministerial, operational, 
or implementing hearing process was initiated and the 
defendants accepted specific constitutional and statutory 
duties owed to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has alleged 
facts, and the admissions already made by the Defendants 
in this case shows, that the constitutional, statutory, 
and regulatory duties of notice, hearings, findings, and 
violations of the expungement code, bearing upon the 
claims of the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff, were 
constitutional duties that were breached by the Defendants 
that were owed the Plaintiff. Wolfenbarger supra at 935; 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services supra 51; 
Berkovitz By Berkovitz v. U.S., 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1959 
(1988); Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S.Ct. 580 
(1988)(recognizing that conduct cannot be discretionary if 
prescribed by law); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 
737-739 (10th Cir. 1977). Consequently, the qualified 
immunity defense of the Defendants must fail. 
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ii. 
THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED CLEARLY ESTABLISHED 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW. 
Even assuming the Defendants1 conduct was 
"discretionary", the constitutional violations alleged in 
the instant case are the intentional deprivations of the 
Plaintiff's certificate, property, liberty, and privacy 
interests without due process of law. The Defendants do 
not dispute that the Plaintiff's certificate constitutes 
an entitlement to a property and liberty interest, or that 
their violations of due process or the expungement code 
deprived the Plaintiff of these interests. Nor do they 
dispute that a deprivation occurred. 
The questions then for the court are whether, in 
light of clearly established statutory and constitutional 
law and the facts of this case, whether reasonable 
officials should have known that it was not lawful for 
them to (1) violate due process and suspend and revoke the 
Plaintiff's certificate without prior not:ce and an 
opportunity for the Plaintiff to respond, without any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, and then to 
notify every state in the United States of the revocation; 
(2) refuse to return the Plaintiff's certificate prior to 
its reconsideration hearings; (3) use sealed and expunged 
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records in violation of Utah's Expungement Act, at the 
reconsideration hearings in order to support the 
Defendants1 original suspension and revocation of the 
Plaintiff's certificate; and (4) then without any 
findings or conclusions uphold its original revocation 
resulting in the deprivation of the Plaintiff's property 
and privacy interests which are secured by the United 
States Constitution as well as the expungement code. 
In 1988, when the Defendants' actions breached their 
duties owed to the Plaintiff, the law was clearly 
established that the Plaintiff was, by constitutional, 
statutory, and administrative prescription, entitled to 
notice, and opportunity to respond prior to suspension and 
revocation of a protected property, and liberty interest. 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699 (1972); 
Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 575 (10th Cir. 1985); Miller 
v. City of Mission, Kan., 705 F.2 368, 373 (10th Cir. 
1983); Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1983). 
It was clearly established in March of 1988 through 
March of 1989 that the Defendants should have returned 
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the Plaintiff's certificate, prior to its reconsideration 
hearings, as the Plaintiff was entitled due process in 
the first instance. At a minimum, the subsequent 
"reconsideration hearings" were constitutionally 
inadequate due to the failure of the Defendants to return 
the Plaintiff's certificate. Cleveland Board of Ed. v. 
Loudermill supra, at 547 n. 12, 84 L.Ed.2d at 507 n. 
12; Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987); Ward v. 
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80 (1972). 
It was clearly established in March of 1988 through 
March of 1989 that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
protection from arbitrary deprivations of his property, 
liberty and privacy interests protected by statutory 
entitlement. Whalen v. Roe, 429, U.S. 589, 599 n. 23, 97 
S.Ct. 876 n. 23, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507 (1971); 
Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 933-934 (10th Cir. 
1987); Miller v. City of Missions supra, at 373; Celebrity 
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n supra. 
It was clearly established in March of 1988 through 
March of 1989 that the Plaintiff possessed a protectable 
legitimate expectation under the constitution that 
information found in a sealed and expunged file would 
remain confidential while in the State's possession. Nixon 
- 44 -
v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 
457-58, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797-90, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1977). 
Additionally, it was clearly established that the 
Plaintiff had a statutory expectation that the expunged 
evidence would not be used by the Defendants to summarily 
suspend and revoke the Plaintiff's certificate. Likewise, 
it was clearly established under decisional law in Utah. 
In State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (Utah 1978), expunged 
records were found inadmissible as evidence in cases like 
the one before this court. Further this court's holding 
in Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1981), forbade the 
use of expunged records as evidence of moral turpitude in 
state governmental license revocation proceedings. Also, 
Doe v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 782 P.2d 489 (1989) 
was pending before this Court and the trial court had 
already decided that the State could not use sealed and 
expunged records in a licensing matter. The clear 
language of Utah's Expungement Statute and these cases 
should have made it sufficiently clear that the instant 
defendants should have understood what they were doing 
violated the Plaintiff's rights secured thereunder. In 
light of this "pre-existing law", the instant Defendants' 
unlawfulness is apparent. The Defendants attempted to 
carve out an exception for itself that was not provided 
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for in the statute nor supported by prior case law. 
Ambus v. Utah State Board of Ed. supra. 
The Defendants1 ministerial acts of depriving the 
Plaintiff of his entitlement to his property, liberty and 
privacy interests created and secured by state law, have 
damaged the Plaintiff's good name, reputation and 
professional image sufficiently to impose a "badge of 
infamy" and disability that has foreclosed the Plaintiff's 
freedom to take advantage of employment opportunities in 
every state in the United States. 
The Plaintiff's constitutional right to engage in his 
occupation was deprived by the Defendants' violations of 
clearly established constitutional and statutory law. 
The Plaintiff's certificate, and privacy interests, were 
benefits and entitlements secured by state law, and 
likewise, his liberty and privacy interests 
constitutionally protected. Under these circumstances the 
Defendants should not be entitled to qualified immunity 
and the lower court's ruling is clear error. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE 
PLAINTIFFfS CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING DEPRIVATIONS OF 
PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges specific 
deprivations of property and liberty interests directly 
- 46 -
under the United States and Utah Constitutions. In 
Paragraph 16, the Plaintiff alleges that his certificate 
is property and his name and reputation are liberty 
interests within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as 
under Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and 
related provisions. Paragraphs 19, 37, 44, and 48 asserts 
that the deprivation of the Plaintiff's property and 
liberty interests violates these same provisions of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. The District Court 
failed to rule on these allegations. 
The Plaintiff contends that he has stated viable 
causes of action against the Defendants directly under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution as well as directly under Article 1 Section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. These constitutional provisions 
were created specifically to protect property and liberty 
interests of citizens which were safeguarded by the 
respective Constitutions. Clearly, an implied cause of 
action under the stated Federal Constitutional provisions 
is proper. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228 (1979); and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized: 
"Where legal rights have been invaded, 
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and a federal statute provides for a general 
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts 
may use any available remedy to make good the 
wrong done•...Our government has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, not 
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve 
this high appellation if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools and William Prescott, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 
1033 (1992) (quoting Bell v. Hood supra and 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 CRANCH 137, 163 (1803). 
Consistent with the federal notice of an implied 
cause of action directly under the federal constitution, 
state courts have also found an implied cause of action 
directly under state constitutions. In a case having 
defenses asserted similar to the instant controversy, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the government's 
defenses and found that an individual may redress an 
unlawful deprivation of liberty or property interests by 
an implied cause of action directly under the North 
Carolina's Constitution. Corum v. University of North 
Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992). Also see: Bagg v. 
University of Tex. Medical Branch, 726 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Ct. 
App. 1987); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 479 
A.2d 921, 927-929 (Md. 1984) (citing numerous state courts 
redressing a state or federal constitutional deprivation 
by an implied damage action); Fenton v. Groveland 
Community Serv. Dist., 135 Cal.App. 3d 797 (Cal.App. 
1982); Gay Law Student Association v. Pacific Telephone 
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Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979); Porten v. University of San 
Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 825 (Cal. App. 1976)(damages 
awarded for improper disclosure of academic records). 
While this court has yet to address the issue, this 
Court has recognized that the people of Utah established 
the Utah Constitution as a limitation on the power of the 
government, and that the Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 22, is self-executing and needs no legislation to 
activate it. Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 
622, 634-635 (Utah 1990). Similarly, the due process 
clauses of both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
need no legislation to activate them and a damage remedy 
to redress violations should be implied as a matter of 
law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the District Court's Order dismissing the 
Plaintiff's Complaint and remanding for the purpose of 
addressing the damage claims of the Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff also requests this Court to award attorneys 
fees and for the successful prosecution of this appeal. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff requests oral argument in this matter, 
DATED this V day of July, 1992. 
STEPHEN W. "COOK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
Stephen W. Cook, of the law firm COOK & DAVIS, 
attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant herein; served the 
attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the \? day of JulY/ 1992, 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
July, 1992. 
— — — — — - — " • • • " * ? Notarr Public > KARENLTKNUTSCr: 
W$mkl MtComtni««iooExp'rc:. • 
•tr tKffl becemoer 30.1C - 2 
My-^*©itfflvission E x p i r e s : Residing a t S a l t Lake County 
/ 2 -«&>-? 2— 
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A D D E N D U M 
STEPHEN W. COOK, USB # 0720 
COOK & DAVIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY T. AMBUS, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, THE ESTATE OF 
JAMES R. MOSS, deceased, 
individually and as 
Superintendent of the UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
JAY B. TAGGART, NEOLA BROWN, 
KEITH T. CHECKETTS, JOHN 
M.R. COVEY, RUTH HARDY FUNK, 
DARLENE HUTCHISON, FRANCES 
HATCH MERRILL, M. RICHARD 
MAXFIELD, DONALD G. 
CHRISTENSEN, MARGARET R. 
NELSON, VALERIE J. KENSON, 
and JOHN MILLECAM, individually 
and as members of the UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; 
GAIL L. MLADEJOVSKY, MARILYN 
WENZEL, JEANINE T. BOSCH, 
JOHN L. JAUSSI, and PAUL J. 
RASBAND, individually and as 
members of the Professional 
Practices Advisory Commission; 
and ROGER C. MOURITSEN, 
individually and as Executive 
Secretary of the UTAH STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
SECOND AMENDED 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
" JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 890901757AA 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendants. 
The Plaintiff, Gregory T. Ambus, by and through his 
counsel, Stephen w. Cook, hereby petitions for judicial 
review as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Judicial Review) 
1. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court under and 
by virtue of the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction 
pursuant to Title 42, United States Codes, Sections 1983, 
1985, and 1988 and Title 28, United States Code, Sections 
1331 and 1343; also pursuant to the United States and Utah 
Constitutions for direct enforcement thereof; also 
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. (1953), as amended; 
and also pursuant to Section 78-3-4 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. 
2. The Petitioner is Gregory T. Ambus whose mailing 
address is 3316 El Serrito Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84109. 
3. The Defendant Utah State Board of Education is a 
respondent agency and its mailing address is 250 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. It is sued in the 
capacity as a "state entity11 for purposes of Title 42, 
U.S.C., Sections 1983, 1985 and 1988 and prospective 
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injunctive relief, attorneys fees, and court costs. 
4. The Estate of Defendant James R. Moss is sued 
for his individual acts and for his acts in an official 
capacity as Superintendent of the Utah State Board of 
Education. 
5. The Defendants Jay B. Taggert, Neola Brown, 
Keith T. Checketts, John M. R. Covey, Ruth Hardy Funk, 
Darlene Hutchison, Frances Hatch Merrill, M. Richard 
Maxfield, Donald G. Christensen, Margaret R. Nelson, 
Valerie J. Kenson, and John Millecam, are sued 
individually and in their official capacities as members 
of the Utah State Board of Education. 
6. The Defendants Gail L. Mladejovsky, Marilyn 
Wenzel, Jeanine T. Bosch, John L. Jaussi, and Paul J. 
Rasband are sued individually and in their official 
capacities as members of the Utah State Professional 
Practices Advisory Commission, an agent of the Utah State 
Board of Education. 
7. The Defendant Roger C. Mouritsen is sued 
individually and in his official capacity as Executive 
Secretary of the Utah State Board of Education. At all 
times herein material, the Defendant Roger C. Mouritsen 
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aided, assisted, and encouraged all other individual 
Defendants in the deprivation of Petitioner's rights, 
privileges, and liberties as hereinafter set forth. 
8. At all times herein material, the Defendants 
were acting under color of law and deprived the Petitioner 
of rights, privileges, and liberties protected by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and State of 
Utah. In addition, at all times pertinent herein, the 
Defendants were performing ministerial acts which created 
policies which operated to deprive the Petitioner of such 
rights, privileges, and liberties. 
9. The title and date of the final agency action to 
be reviewed is the initial revocation of the Petitioner's 
teaching certificate on August 19, 1988 and the final 
revocation of the Petitioner's teaching certificate on 
March 16, 1989. A copy of such initial agency action is 
attached as Exhibit A and a copy of final agency action is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
10. The persons who were parties to the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action are 
the Petitioner and the Defendants as identified above. 
11. A copy of the written order from the informal 
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proceeding is attached as Exhibit C. 
12. The Defendant Utah State Board of Education is a 
state agency charged by the Utah Constitution, Article X, 
Section 8 and by Utah Law, Section 53A-1-401 U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, with the general supervision and 
control of the public school system. 
13. As part of the Defendant Utah State Board of 
Education's duties of general supervision and control, it 
has authority to issue and revoke certificates to teach 
under Section 53A-6-101 et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. 
14. Under Section 53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, the Defendant Utah State Board of Education may 
revoke or suspend state certificates "for immoral, 
unprofessional, or incompetent conduct or evident 
unfitness for services authorized by the certificates. 
15. On August 13, 1981, the Defendant Utah State 
Board of Education issued to Petitioner a Standard 
Secondary Certificate with Biological and Physical Science 
endorsements. 
16. Petitioner's Certificate to teach constitutes 
property within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I 
Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah and related 
provisions. Petitioner's good name and reputation are 
liberty interests also protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah and 
related provisions. 
17. At all times herein material, the Petitioner's 
Certificate was valid until revoked by the Defendant Utah 
State Board of Education for cause as described herein. 
18. On March 18, 1988, the Defendant Utah State 
Board of Education, through the Defendant Roger C. 
Mouritsen, filed a Complaint against the Petitioner for, 
"Information was received indicating that Gregory Ambus as 
charged with two counts of drug distribution and one count 
of drug selling, stemming from alleged marijuana exchanges 
with or witnessed by a police informant." 
19. Any revocation of the Petitioner's Certificate 
to teach on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint 
or on the basis of immorality, unprofessional or 
incompetent conduct deprived the Petitioner of his liberty 
and property interests under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution and under 
Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and related 
provisions. 
20. On August 17, 1988, the Petitioner was employed 
by the Salt Lake City School District pursuant to a 
written contract which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and 
is incorporated by reference herein. 
21. On August 19, 19 88, the Defendant Utah State 
Board of Education initially revoked the Petitioner's 
Certificate by letter dated August 24, 1988 from the 
Defendant State Superintendent which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein. 
22. On August 24, 1988, the Petitioner requested 
reconsideration of the revocation by letter which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit E and is incorporated by 
reference herein. 
23. On August 24, 19 88, the Salt Lake City School 
District terminated the Petitioner's contract of 
employment with the Salt Lake City School District because 
the Petitioner's Certificate had been revoked. 
24. On September 26, 1988, the Defendants scheduled 
a hearing to consider reinstatement of the Petitioner's 
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Certificate. See Exhibit F which is attached and 
incorporated by reference herein. 
25. On September 27, 1988, Petitioner through his 
counsel specifically protested the revocation of 
Petitioner's Certificate to teach without due process and 
demanded that the Certificate be restored prior to any 
further hearings. See Exhibit G which is attached and 
incorporated by reference herein. 
26. On October 20, 1988, an informal hearing was 
conducted by the Defendants. In such hearing, the 
Petitioner denied any wrongdoing. In addition, the 
Petitioner objected to the hearing on several bases. See 
Exhibit H which is attached and incorporated by reference 
herein. 
27. On March 16, 1989, the Defendants notified the 
Petitioner of its final agency action that its initial 
revocation of the Petitioner's Certificate was upheld. 
The Defendants did not issue any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law to justify any revocation as required 
by statute or as required by the United States 
Constitution or the Constitution of Utah. 
28. The Petitioner is entitled to judicial review by 
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trial de novo under Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended• 
29. The Defendants unlawfully revoked the 
Petitioner's Certificate in violation of Section 53A-6-104 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, and the Petitioner's right to 
due process of law in that the Petitioner's alleged 
conduct was not immoral, unprofessional, incompetent, or 
evident unfit for services authorized by his Certificate. 
30. The Petitioner lacks an adequate remedy at law. 
31. The Petitioner is entitled to a preliminary and 
final Order, Judgment, and Decree restoring the 
Petitioner's Certificate to teach. 
32. The Petitioner is entitled to a reasonable 
attorneys fees. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and 
judgment as more particularly set forth herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Pre-Deprivation Hearing) 
33. The Petitioner incorporates by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 3 2 of his First Cause of Action as if 
specifically set forth herein. 
34. Petitioner's Certificate to teach could not 
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revoked without a prior deprivation hearing with full 
substantive and procedural due process of law being 
afforded. Such legal rights were clearly established 
prior to bhe events complained of herein. 
35, On May 20, 1988, the Defendant Professional 
Practices Advisory Commission through the actions of the 
individual Defendant members, recommended to the Defendant 
State Board of Education that the Petitioner's teaching 
certificate be suspended until such time as the Petitioner 
requested a hearing before the Commission, 
36, On August 24, 1988, the Defendant Utah State 
Board of Education through the actions of the individual 
Defendant members, revoked the Petitioner's Certificate to 
teach without prior notice or hearing to the Petitioner. 
By law, any such revocation was because the Petitioner 
engaged in conduct which was immorale, unprofessional, 
incompetent, or unfit. Nevertheless, the Defendants made 
no findings of fact or conclusions of law which justified 
any suspension or revocation. 
37, The actions of the Defendants, as described in 
the preceding two paragraphs violated the Petitionerf s 
right to procedural and substantive due process of law as 
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provided in the Utah and United States Constitutions, and 
the Amendments thereto, as well as the Petitioner's right 
to equal protection and due process of law under Section 
1983 and 1985, Title 42, United States Code. 
38. As a result of the Defendants acts and 
violations as set forth above, the Petitioner was 
wrongfully deprived of liberty and property interests. In 
particular, the wrongful revocation of the Petitioner's 
Certificate to teach resulted in his loss of employment 
from August 24, 1988 to the present and resulted in damage 
to the Petitioner's good name and reputation, not only in 
the State of Utah but also in each state of the United 
States. 
39. The Petitioner is entitled to damages and/or 
equitable monetary relief ancillary to injunctive relief 
for his loss of employment opportunities from the 
defendants in their individual capacities, from August 24, 
1988 until the Plaintiff receives a proper pre-deprivation 
hearing or until the Plaintiff receives comparable gainful 
employment, whichever first occurs. 
40. As a further result of the individual 
defendants' wrongful acts, the Petitioner has suffered, 
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and continues to suffer loss of professional reputation 
and standing, substantial mental and emotional distress 
and suffering, including medical expenses, all to his 
general damages in the amount of $500,000.00 and special 
damages in the amount of $5,000.00. 
41. The individual defendants knew or should have 
known, that the Petitioner was clearly entitled to a 
proper pre-deprivation hearing and such rights were 
clearly established at such time. The failure to provide 
such a hearing was in callous and malicious disregard of 
the Petitioner's constitutional rights, constituted cruel 
indifference to his personal well-being, and was 
substantially lacking in good faith. The Petitioner is 
therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount found 
to be reasonable by the Court as a wholesome warning to 
the defendants and to others similarly situated to avoid 
conduct of the nature complained of herein. 
42. The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and 
judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Use of Expunged Proceedings) 
43. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference 
Paragraphs 1-42 of his First and Second Causes of Action 
as if specifically set forth herein. 
44. In revoking the Petitioner's Certificate, the 
Defendants utilized evidence which was expunged, sealed, 
and judicially pardoned by Orders of this Court and by law 
all in violation of the due process provisions of the 
United States Constitution, its Amendments, as well as the 
Constitution of Utah. In addition, the alleged conduct of 
the Petitioner which formed the basis of the revocation 
occurred more than one year prior and the use thereof by 
the Defendants violated Section 78-12-29(2) U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended. 
45. The Petitioner is entitled to an Order restoring 
the Petitioner's Certificate to teach. 
46. The Petitioner is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays for relief and 
judgment as more particularly set forth herein. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Post Deprivation Hearing) 
47. The Petitioner incorporates by reference 
Paragraphs 1-46 of his First, Second, and Third Causes of 
Action as if specifically set forth herein. 
48. The individual Defendants1 use of expunged, 
sealed, and pardoned evidence in suspending, revoking, and 
failing to reinstate the Petitioner's Certificate violated 
the Petitioner's right to due process and equal protection 
of the law in violation of the Utah and United States 
Constitution and its Amendments. In addition, the 
individual Defendants' use of such evidence violated the 
Petitioner's right to privacy and adversely affected his 
liberty interests in maintaining his good name, 
professional standing, and position in society. Lastly, 
the individual Defendants failed to provide any findings 
of fact or conclusions to support its actions in violation 
of the Utah and United States Constitution, and its 
Amendments. 
49. As a result of the individual defendant's 
wrongful acts, the Plaintiff suffered the loss of his 
employment from August 24, 1988 to the present not only in 
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the State of Utah but each of the United States. The 
Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the individual 
defendants for such loss until he becomes re-employed, in 
an amount found reasonable by the Court, In the 
alternative, the Petitioner is entitled to damages for 
lost income and future earnings. 
50. As a further result of the individual 
defendants1 wrongful acts, the Petitioner has suffered, 
and continues to suffer loss of professional reputation 
and standing, substantial mental and emotional distress 
and suffering, including medical expenses, all to his 
general damages in the amount of $500,000.00 and special 
damages in the amount of $5,000.00. 
51. The individual defendants knew, or should have 
known, that the Petitioner was clearly entitled to privacy 
and a proper due process hearing, including findings, and 
such rights were clearly established at such time. The 
failure to respect the Petitioner's privacy and the 
failure to provide a due process hearing with findings 
were in callous and malicious disregard of the 
Petitioner's constitutional rights, constituted cruel 
indifference to his personal well-being, and was 
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substantially lacking in good faith. The Petitioner is 
therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount found 
to be reasonable by the Court as a wholesome warning to 
the defendants and to others similarly situated to avoid 
conduct of the nature complained of herein. 
52. The Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully petitions for 
relief as follows: 
1. For Judicial Review of the Agency's actions by 
trial de novo pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-15 U.C.A 
(1953), as amended; 
2. For a preliminary and permanent injunction 
requiring the Respondent to immediately reinstate the 
Petitioner's Certificate; 
3. For a Judgment restoring the Plaintiff's 
certificate to teach nunc pro tunc as of the date of 
revocation; 
4. For damages to be found by the Court for the 
Petitioner's loss of employment opportunities; 
5. For the sum of $500,000.00 in compensatory 
damages for the Petitioner's mental and emotional 
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distress; 
6. For special damages in the amount of $5,000.00; 
7. For punitive damages in an amount found 
reasonable by the Court; and, 
8. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs of 
court. 
DATED this 3~Q day of December, 1990. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
3316 El Serrito Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
- 17 -
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW GREGORY T. AMBUS, having first been 
duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and says that he is the 
plaintiff in the above action, that he has read the 
foregoing Second Verified Petition for Judicial Review and 
Complaint and executed the same, and that he knows the 
contents thereof to be true, except to those items stated 
on information, and believes those items to be true. 
/ (jA^Aj^y^xy^ 
GREGORY T. AMBUS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this tf\0\ day 
of December, 1990. 
Notary Public \ 
KAREN L KNUTSCH 5 
1815 E Osage Orange Avo. J 
SaltUkeCit/. Utah 84124 J 




Resting in Sail: Lake County 
[g-acN^-z-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
ss. 
) 
KAREN L. KNUTSON, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Cook & Davis, 
attorneys for Plaintiff herein; and that she served the 
attached SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND COMPLAINT upon: 
Mr. John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the JbM) day of December, 19 90. 
KA&JENTJ. KNUTSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this c^/h day of 
December, 19 90. 
My Commission Expires: 
MARK C. JAHNE. ' 
ReijdMzbBgnw*kR<§gils> i | a k e C o u n t y 
<A Salt Lake City '" 
^ UT 84121 
OF \£ • w 
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UJ 
UTAHSTATKHOAK OOF EDUCATION 
UTAH STATE HOARD FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
KrMhT.CUi-kftis/Ch»«ir • Kuih lUrrfv Fuiik/Vu-fChMJr 
N"«l* Jinm-n . l).Mi:ild<;.<:i>risJ«.nM-n • J..hn M. H. Cm-fv 
nHrl.Mi..(Ml.n,-|,is.iii . \ M n i f J.K«-l>-in 
M. Ki.-ltMi«< Mn*ii«-M . MMIC^HM l(. N.-U.n 
Gregory Thomas Ambus 
649 East 1600 South 
Bountiful , Utah 84010 
Dear Pr. Ambus: 
The Utah State Board of Education at its regular meeting held on 
August 19, 1988, took formal actio* to revoke your Standard Secondary 
Certificate with Biological and Physical Science endorsements effective 
immediately. This action is based! on a hearing held and recommendation .made 
by the Utah Professional Practices Advisory Commission. 
Since your certificate reflects validity through June 30, 1991, it is required 
that you surrender your certificate to this office immediately. You may mail 
or deliver your certificate to us in person. 
Sincerely, 
James R. Moss 
State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction 
UTAH STATE OFFICE 
OF EDUCATION 
. | * I U I - S H. Moss 




UTAH STATE OFFICE 
OF EDUCATION 
J * I T H - N R . Me)NS 
Sla te SuiH-nntrnr icnl «»f Pubhv. Instruct ion 
UTAH STATE BOAKO OF EDUCATION 
U T A H S T A T E B O A K O KOH V O C A T I O N A L E D U C A T I O N 
Kuth H*rriv Funk/Ch*ir • Nr«>U Brown/ V * e Chair 
Kci lhT . CheckdU • Donald G.Cht*Hrn~en 
John M R. Covrv . DarlcncC. Hutchsson 
VMUrnt J .KrUon • V J.v Liechly • M. Richard Maxrvcld 
RECEIVED AT 
COOK & WILDE 
MAR 16 1989 
March 16, 1989 
Gregory T. Ambus 
649 East 1600 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Mr. Ambus: 
The State Board of Education has received the findings and 
recommendation from the appeal panel appointed 1 o consider your request for 
reinstatement of your teaching certificate. Th<: panel recommended that "the 
decision of the State Board of Bfccation made on August 18, 1988, be upheld, 
i.e., that the revocation of Gregory Ambus1 teaching certificate be upheld." 
A copy of the Hearing Officer1 s letter to me dated January 5, 1989, is 
enclosed. 
The Utah State Board of Education has directed me to inform you that 
they accept the panel recommendation and that the revocation will stand. 
> 
Since re ly yours , 
James R. -Moss 
State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction 
JRM/la/01 
enclosure 
cc: Stephen W. Cook (hand delivered 3-16-89) 
( PRACTICES V ADVISORY \ 
Je«n1r*e T. Bosch 
Chairman 
KSS South Kaderi M i l s 
Bountiful , UT 8*010 




Denlse H. Oaniels 
RFO 3 BOJC 212 
Spanish Fort , UT 84660 
Kyle 0 . Oye 
Rt. 1 dox 1342 
R o o s e r s l t , UT W066 
E. Art Elchbaaer 
UX7 East Bob t i n * 
S*ndy, UT 84092 
Rosalie S. Er>alind 
220 Tule Circ le 
Tooele , UT 8407* 
John L. Jairssl 
Rax 523 
C o 4 l Y l l l t , UT 84017 
&«n L HUdejovsky 
2826 E. Thunderblrd Or. 
S a l t L A U C U y , UT 8410$ 
Pial J . JUsbtnd 
485 E u t 520 north 
A d r i a n Fort , UT 84003 
Hardy* Uenxel 
107S South 9S0 East 
S t . 6eor^e, UT 84770 
Betty YanovUx 
3327 E. Chaundra Ave. 
S a l t Lake C U y , UT 8412* 
2SQ E~* FiftL S~tL S*w SJt UU d*. UuL m 
January S, 1989 
Superintendent James R. Moss 
Utah State Office of Education 
250 East 500 South 
Sal t LateCi^y* Utah 84111 
Dear Superintendent Moss: 
On October TO, 1988, a hearing panel was convened to-
consider a request of Gregory T. Ambus for reinstatement 
of his teact'ing c e r t i f i c a t e . The Rules for Adjudicative 
Hearings were invoked and Ms. Gail Mladejovsky was 
appointed hearing officer by the State Board of Education 
to hear the appeal. Members of the hearing panel were 
MarilynIfenzel, Jeanine Bosch, John Jaussi , and Paul 
Rasband^ 
Mr. Ambc was represented by counsel a t the hearing which 
was he!4 in the Sal t Lake City School Distr ict Offices. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the panel reviewed the evidence 
and the following is a motion made on December 16, 1988, 
by John Jaussi and seconded by Paul Rasband: 
The hearing panel recommends that the 
decision of the State Board of Education 
made on August 18, 1988, be upheld, i . e . , 
ttet the revocation of Gregory Ambus1 
teaching ce r t i f i ca te be upheld. 
Sincerely, 
. . . . . •» J _ • i , . . V 
Executive Secretary 
Rocer C. KourUsen 
Gail L-Kladejovsky 
Hearinf Off icer 
GLM:rn 
<A0 East First South 
ALT LAKECTTY SCHOOL DISTRICT I I Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
I D I 
fame Greoorv T. Ambus
 : Date P-37-83 
You have been approved for recommendation to the Board of Education for employment to a position in the 
alt Lake City School District as indicated below (Forcontract teachers the first two years are provisional status, 
our employment is conditioned upon the Continuing Written Agreement.) 
osition: Teacher Tirae/FTE: Full ( 1 . 0 ) 
Salary: L'\342* Step/Lane/Code: 6-B 
Calendars Months Pay Period Base: Biweeklyl _.Monthly I 
ffective Date: 1988-89 School Year Vacation (12 Month contracts only): 
^Salary to be adjusted per 1988-39 negotiations. 
ou are tentatively assigned to: KioH anrj-Phvsical Sc ience . 
Upon approval by the Board, this becomes a contractual agreement and you should not sign it unless you are 
Die and intend to fulfill your part of the agreement, including reporting for work on all of the days designated 
i the calendar, except leave days as provided by the policies and regulations of the Board of Education. You 
iay not sign another contract while this one is in force. If this offer of employment is acceptable to you and you 
-e confident that you can fulfill the terms and cooditiona expressed herein, you should sign and return it to 
tach the Personnel Office within (5) five days. 
Before this contract is effective, the employee shall furnish the following (CHECKED) documents which 
list be acceptable to the Board of Education: 
1_ A Physical Examination Report by a doctor ofmedkaneonjafcrmrxovided 
expense 
L. ATur>erailinTest 
L... An ExiroUment Form for Utah State RetiremeaaSystem 
L_ AW^IncoaMTaxWithhd 
L- Insurance Registration Forma 
L. A copy of the empk>yee'sSc*id Security Card»dD^ 
!L Form 1-9 
__ Valid Teaching Certificate for Utah appropriateto assignment 
— Official Transcripts) of credits and evident* of all acquired acadftmir degrees (Must include the 
institution, date, majors) and ruinous) of eackdegree) 
— State Annual Information Sheet 
Verification of prior experience 
Documentation of Military Service 
License or Permit. 
Other Documentation. 
Administrator far Personnel Services 
I accept the offer indicated above and agree to abide by the policies and procedures of the Board of 
Education, and I agree that I. will give the School District thirty days' advance notice in writing of my 
resignation (for classified personnel fifteen dayi'notice shall be given). 
Signed Ov .- \ (L^^vv* / . / Y m ^ M / u l Date V ~ / 7 " ^ £ 
Address / l / <?' (C ILOO^ City fjourJ.M** I Slate (H cL Zip $ </Q / G 
Soc. Security / SZ9' <?'/' if'/YL Birthdate /£• - 2 - 5" jT (Mon-Day-Yr) Phone # Prj^ - 3> l/C 
NOTE: 9-month personnel paid monthly must adsct a 12-oav or a IG-nav schedule! 
Gregory T. Ambus 
649 E. 1600 S. 
Bountiful , Utah 84010 
801-232-3340 
gust 24,- 1988 
mes R. Moss Superintendent 
ah State Board of Education 
0 East 500 South 
It Lake City, Utah 841J1 
ar Dr. Moss, 
am requesting an emergency meeting wit* you or the Utah State Board of Education, 
have submitted to Dr.- Mouritsen copies of the Hearing Decision which was held 
fore Garth Mangum May 19, 1987. • Hav i ng rev ? ewed some of the file concerning the 
vocation of my certificate, I did not respond to the notices because. ,1 did not 
cefve them. I was in Arizona coachingand teaching and Granite School District" 
s well aware of my address. 
have also submitted pages 22-27 of.a roogh draft of my attorney's memorandum 
ncerningour current court .case.- These pdgeiyfev i ew our situation concerning 
e hearing process for educators and'Utafe statute 53-51-7• 
have written this letter to request ttois emergency meeting based on winning the 
Dve mentioned hearing, being hired in Sat t" Lake School- District, and being denied 
a ability to teach there. The hearing process with Dr. Mangum should allow me to 
sp my Utah Teaching Certificate, and to accept the position With Salt lake District. 
ank You for your time in reviewing this matter. 
icerely, 
Y . Ci^n^xJc^c^^^ 
sgory T. Ambus 
OFESSIONAlV PRACTICES V ADVISORY }( COMMISSION 
i W T. Bosch 
Sovth K»d<-r« H i l l s 
t l f u l , UT S4010 
K. Wells 
-Cto trm*n 
C 1 1 n<j , 
<S18 
I* K. &*n1«U 
X Box 212 
i i ^ Tort . UT £4660 
0 . Oye 
lax 13*2 
v r i t . UT &4066 
t £1ch64j«r 
£ « s t Bob Lio« 
. UT &40S2 
1< S. CngUnd 
u le C1rcl« 
e . UT &4074 
i U e . UT S4017 
.. Mlao>joviky 
. Thiimdcrblrd Dr. 
*k« C i t y . UT S4109 
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J t 520 Morth 
4« f o r k , UT $4003 
ooth 9S0 t * s t 
o r o * , UT S4770 
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ik« C i t y , UT £412* 
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September 26, 1988 
Gregory T. Ambus 
649 East 1600 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Mr. Ambus: 
A hearing to consider reinstatement of your teaching 
certificate has bee« scheduled before a panel- of the Utah 
Professional Practices Advisory Commission. The list of the 
names of the individuals assigned to hear your case is 
enclosed. The hearing will be held Thursday, October 6, 
1988, in the West Board Room of the Utah State Office of 
Education, 250 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
beginning at 2:00 pj*. 
Should you be unable to meet at the time and place scheduled 
or if you object to any member of the hearing panel, please 
notify us immediately. Otherwise, we will expect you to be 
in attendance. You cay bring legal counsel and any 
witnesses or others that you wish to have testify in your 
behalf. We have enclosed a copy of our Rules of Procedure 
for Hearing Complaints. 
If you have any question regarding procedure for the 
hearing, please letue know. 




cc: tephen W. Co*, Attorney at Law 
Twila Bringhurst (secretary to the 
State Board of Education) 
William Christapulos, Granite School District 
n ^ T ~ u-»-_,*--
COOK AND WILDE 
TEPHEN W COOK 
OBERTH. WILDE 
ONALO £. KUNZ 6925 UNIOK PARK CENTER. SUHTE 490 
> H N ~ R I C £ «
I V A L E
-
 U X A H 8 4 < M 7
 TELEPHONE 80,-^-6000 
1CHOLASJ.ANCELIDES ™ C 80|.*. .3829 
Ell) C. DAVIS 
September 27, 1988 
Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary 
Utah Professional Practices Advisory Commission 
State Office of Education 
250 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Gregory T. Ambus 
Dear Dr. Mouritsen: 
As your file reflects, I represent Gregory T. Ambus. 
I am in receipt of a letter addressed to Mr. Ambus dated 
September 22, 1988 from jou. Based upon the facts set 
forth below, as I understand themf the purpose of this 
letter is to request that Mr. Ambus1 certificate be 
immediately restored to bam pending a new de novo due 
process hearing to revoke such certificate if .such is 
still desired. 
The following are the facts as I understand them: 
(a) On July-30# 1981 Mr.. Ambus registered-his 
address with the Board of Education as 3316 El Serrito 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utdb 84109. 
(b) For approximately four years, until January 
23, 1987, Mr. Ambus was employed with the Granite School 
District. As of that date, Mr. Ambus* address was 831 
Stratford Avenue, Salt Lafae City, Utah 84106. 
(c) Since January 23, 1987, to the present, 
many school officials knew where Mr. Ambus resided, or 
where he could be contacted, and knew that he was 
represented by me, as his counsel, in litigation pending 
before the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah. 
Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary 
September 27, 1988 
Page Two 
(d) On March 18, 1988, two years -after the 
alleged event/ Dr. Mouritsen filed a complaint before the 
U.P.P.A.C. because, "Information was received indicating 
that Gregory Ambus was charged with two counts of drug 
distribution and one count of drug selling, stemming from 
alleged marijuana exchanges with or witnessed by a police 
informant." 
(e) The Complaint of Dr. Mouritsen was sent to 
831 Stratford Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Apparently, 
Granite School District provided this address. Such 
correspondence was returned by the post office. 
(f) On April U f 1988, Dr. Mouritsen sent a 
Notice of Hearing to 831 Stratford Avenue, Salt" Lake City, 
Utah 84105. Such correspondence was returned unclaimed. 
(g) Mr. Ambus never received the correspondence 
described above. 
(h) Apparently on May 20, 1988, a hearing of 
some unknown kind was held and a recommendation to suspend 
was provided. 
(i) On August 19, 1988, the State Board of 
Education revoked Mr. Ambus • certificate. 
(j) On August 24, 19.88, Mr. Ambus requested 
immediate review by the State Board of Education. 
(k) Apparently the State Board of Education 
referred the matter back before the U.P.P.A.C. 
(1) As I understand Dr .. Mouri tsen ' s ]etter 
dated September 26, 1988, the hearing now scheduled for 
October 6, 1988, is not ade novo due process hearing. 
Rather, it is a hearing to "consider reinstatement" of Mr. 
Ambus' certificate. 
Dr. Roger C. Mouritsen, Executive Secretary 
September 27, 1988 
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With the above facts in mind, I would suggest that 
Mr. Ambus* certificate be reinstated immediately and that, 
if still requested by the Complainant, a hearing be held 
to determine whether the certificate be revoked. 
First, Section 53-50-J 2.5 JJ.C.A. (3953), as amended, 
requests that written notice of hearing be sent Mto the 
last known address and to the address shown on the records 
of the commission . . . _" (emphasis added). Such was not 
done in this case and my client never received any notice 
of the hearing. 
Second, both by constitutional and statutory 
prescription, my client is entitled to.due process before 
his certificate is revoked and not after; 
I would like to resolve this issue immediately and 
short of judicial intervention. Would you please have your 
counsel contact me immediately should any questions exist. 
Sincerely, 
SlJb(bJ-
Stephen W. Cook 
SWC:dn 
c c : Gregory T. Ambus 
EXHIBIT 
H 
STEPHEN W. COOK, USB #0720 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-6000 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
UTAH PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES ADVISORY COMMISSION 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
Claimant, 
vs • 
GREGORY T. AMBUS, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
The Respondent, Gregory T. Ambus, by and through his 
counsel, hereby provides formal notice of objections to the 
present proceeding: 
1. Lack of Due Process: Prior Revocation Notices. 
On March 18, 1988, Roger C. Mouritsen filed a Complaint 
with the U.P.P.A.C. against the Respondent. A copy of the 
Complaint was mailed to Respondent at 831 Stratford Avenue 
which was never received by the Respondent and which was 
returned to the U.P.P.A.C- On April 11, 1988, a notice of 
hearing was sent to the Respondent to the same address, 
which apparently was not received and was returned again as 
described above. A hearing was held on May 20, 1988 and 
the U.P.P.A.C recommended that the Respondent's Certificate 
be suspended. The State Board of Education revoked his 
certificate on August 19, 1988 for unprofessional behavior. 
Mr. Ambus first learned of this action on August 24, 1988 
when he was-suspended from teaching in the Salt Lake School 
District. 
The Respondent personally and through his counsel have 
notified the U.P.P.A.C. that the Respondent was not given 
actual notice of *the proceedings. Both have notified the 
State Board of Education and the U.P.P.A.C. that the 
Respondent's right to due process has been violated and has 
demanded that his certificate to teach be restored prior to 
any further hearings. The Respondent therefore objects to 
these proceedings until his certificate is returned. 
Cleveland Board of Education vs. Loudermill, 479 U.S. 532 
(1985); Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d $KT (Utah 
1983); and Worrall v. Oqden City, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
2. Lack of Due Process: Present Hearing Notices. 
Despite the Respondent's requests to do so, the Respondent 
has not received any notice of any specific issue to be 
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decided in these proceedings. There is no question that 
the Respondent is entitled to such notice. Section 
63-460-3 U.C.A. (1953),.as amended; Nelson v." Jacobsen, 
supra; Worrall v. Ogden City, supra. In addition, Utah's 
Administrative Procedure Act has not been followed in many 
respects as provided by law. For example, see Section 
63-46(.b)-3(2) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
3. Lack of Due Process: Constitutionality of Section 
53A-6-104 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. The Respondent 
objects to any proceedings based upon such statute because 
the same is unconstitutionally void. Burton v. Cascade 
School District Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th 
Cir. 1975); State v. Musser, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah 1950). 
4. _ Statute of Limitations-.— This action is barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations, Section 78-12-29 (2) 
U.C.A. (1953) as amended-
5. Expungement. No action may be taken against the 
Respondent due to any events associated with the charges 
which were filed against the Respondent which were 
dismissed, expunged, and sealed. Such actions are binding 
upon the State Superintendent as a State entity and as a 
State official Section 7^-18-2 U.C.A. (1953) as amended. 
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Moreover, the alleged offense was non job related and 
consideration may only be given to job related convictions 
Section 53A-3-410(4) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. An 
unproved offense is no basis for State action in revoking a 
certificate. 
6. Objection to Committee and Presiding Officer. 
JJpon information and belief, the presiding olficer and 
members of the Committee were on the same committee which 
recommended suspension of the Respondent's certificate on 
May 20, 1988. The Respondent is entitled to a fair and 
impartial presiding officer and committee members. 
DATED this aO day of October, 1988. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
-4-
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Objections was hand-delivered, to the 
Presiding Officer, Gail Hladejovoky, this 32-^ 3 aay of 
October, 1988-
#A/fl /Li 
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